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Abstract
In this paper, we study robust joint beamforming and cooperative jamming (CJ) in a secure decode-and-forward (DF)
relay system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, in which a multi-antenna DF relay employs transmit
beamforming to help the source deliver information to the destination and simultaneously generates Gaussian
artificial noise to confuse these eavesdroppers. We assume that all the channel state information (CSI) is imperfectly
known at the relay subject to norm-bounded CSI errors. Our objective is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate at
the destination by jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming vector of information signals and the covariance
matrix of jamming signals at the relay subject to its total transmit power constraint. Although this problem is
non-convex and in general difficult to be solved, we obtain its optimal solution via the technique of semi-definite
relaxation (SDR) together with a one-dimensional (1-D) search. Specifically, we prove that the SDR is tight for the
problem of our interest. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed scheme.
Keywords: Physical layer security, Decode-and-forward (DF) relay, Cooperative jamming (CJ), Robust beamforming,
Semi-definite relaxation (SDR)
1 Introduction
Secure wireless transmissions have drawn significant
attention due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation
and the inherent openness of the transmission medium.
In addition to the traditional encryption techniques, phys-
ical layer security has been recognized as a prominent
technique to realize secure communication by exploit-
ing wireless channel fading (see, e.g., [1–3]). Recently,
the introduction of relay into physical layer security has
attracted a lot of research interest as a promising solu-
tion to improve transmission security through cooperative
diversity [4, 5]. Similar to the traditional relay systems,
amplify-and-forward (AF) [6] and decode-and-forward
(DF) [7] are two commonly used schemes in secure relay
systems.
To further improve physical layer security, artificial
noise (AN) or cooperative jamming (CJ) approach has
been introduced in the secrecy system by embedding
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noise or jamming signal in the transmitted signal to con-
fuse eavesdroppers [8–11]. In addition to helping relay
the desirable information signals from source nodes to
destination nodes, trusted relays can also implement CJ
[12, 13] to confuse the potential eavesdroppers by simul-
taneously sending jamming signals together with the
information signals. Furthermore, due to the success of
multi-antenna techniques in wireless communications,
employing multiple antennas in the secure relay sys-
tems has also been investigated in the literature recently
[14–16], in which the multi-antenna nodes can adjust the
directions of their transmitted information and jamming
signals so as to further improve the secure performance.
Recently, there are some works [17–19] in the litera-
ture investigating joint relay beamforming and CJ design
to maximize the achievable secrecy rate in relay sys-
tems. Specifically, [17] studied secure beamforming and
CJ design in an AF relay system with multiple distributed
relays and multiple eavesdroppers each with a single
antenna, in which the secrecy rate was maximized sub-
ject to both total and individual power constraints at the
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relay nodes. Ding et al. [18] considered joint beamform-
ing and CJ scheme in an AF-based multi-antenna relay
system with an eavesdropper, in which interference align-
ment was used to ensure that jamming signals from the
source and the relay can be aligned together at the des-
tination. The most recent work [19] addressed DF-based
multi-antenna relay beamforming and CJ design in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In [17–19], the global
channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be perfectly
known at both the source and the relay.
However, the practical implementation of beamforming
and CJ design at the multi-antenna relay in secure wireless
communications critically relies on the CSI availability
from the source/relay to the destination/eavesdroppers at
the transmitter [20–23]. This is difficult to be obtained
perfectly in practice due to channel quantization and
feedback errors. As a result, it is essential to investi-
gate the robust relay transmission design under imperfect
CSI. Robust transmit designs for multiple-input single-
output (MISO) wiretap channels under both individual
and global power constraints for the source and the helper
were presented in [21], where transmit covariance matri-
ces at the source and the helper were jointly optimized to
maximize the secrecy rate. Zhao et al. [22] investigated
robust beamforming design of sum secrecy rate opti-
mization under sum power constraint for multiple user-
eavesdropper pairs, and a low complexity zero-forcing
(ZF) beamformers is developed. Ni et al. [23] and Fei et al.
[24] discussed robust coordinated beamforming formulti-
user interference channel secure communications under
imperfect CSI. There have been no consideration of the
relay system in [21–24]. It is worth noting that there has
been a handful of works [25–27] investigating the robust
relay beamforming design. Specifically, [25] investigated
the AF-based relay beamforming scheme in the pres-
ence of multiple eavesdroppers to maximize the secrecy
rate. The imperfect CSI of relay-destination and relay-
eavesdroppers links was modeled using a norm-bounded
CSI error model. Zhang et al. [26] designed robust
joint optimization in bidirectional multi-user multi-relay
MIMO systems, in which authors mainly concentrated
on the sum mean square error (MSE) criterion as well
as maximum user’s MSE. However, the two aforemen-
tioned works did not consider jamming signals generated
by relays to confuse eavesdroppers. Wang and Wang [6]
has considered an AF relaying system with the multiple
distributed relays each with a single antenna. In [27], the
relaying robust beamforming for device-to-device com-
munication with channel uncertainty was considered. To
the best of our knowledge, the DF-based robust joint
beamforming and CJ design for maximizing secrecy rate
in relay systems with imperfect CSI is much less known.
In this paper, we focus on the robust joint beam-
forming and CJ design for a DF-based relay system
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, in which a
single-antenna source sends confidential information to
a single-antenna destination with the assistance of a
multi-antenna relay, and a jamming signal is embed-
ded in the transmitted signal of relay to improve secure
communication. The contributions of this paper are
twofold:
1) The relay operates in a half-duplex mode,
accordingly the transmission is divided into two time
slots. In the first time slot, the source transmits
signals to the destination and the relay, and in the
second time slot, the relay forwards the re-encoded
signals (a jamming signal is embedded in the
transmitted signal of relay) to the destination. It is
presumed that the wireless channels from the
source/relay to the destination/eavesdroppers are
subject to norm-bounded CSI errors.
2) By jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming
vector of information signals and the covariance
matrix of jamming signals at the relay to maximize
the achievable secrecy rate at the destination while
guaranteeing the total transmit power constraint.
Although this problem is non-convex and in general
difficult to be solved, we obtain its optimal solution
via the techniques of semi-definite relaxation (SDR)
together with a one-dimensional (1-D) search.
Furthermore, we prove that the tightness of SDR of
channel uncertainty, which can guarantee the
optimality of the solution in this case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the system model and problem formulation.
Section 3 proposes the optimal solution to the considered
problem. Section 4 presents numerical results to validate
the proposed scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes this
paper.
Notations: Throughout this paper, boldface lowercase
and uppercase letters denote vectors andmatrices, respec-
tively. The transpose, conjugate transpose, rank, and trace
of matrix A are denoted as AT , AH , rank(A), and tr(A),
respectively. A∗ denotes the conjugate of matrix A, and I
denotes the identity matrix. A  0 means A is a positive
semidefinite matrix. The distribution of a circularly sym-
metric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random vector with
mean vector x and covariance matrix  is denoted by
CN (x,); and ∼ stands for “distributed as.”
2 Systemmodel and problem formulation
2.1 Systemmodel
We consider a DF relaying system, which consists of one
source node (S), one relay node (R), one destination node
(D), and K > 1 passive eavesdroppers (Es), as shown in
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Fig. 1. Suppose that the relay is equipped with N > 1
antennas, and each of the other nodes is equipped with a
single antenna. Let K = {1, . . . ,K} denote the set of Es.
The relay operates in a half-duplex mode, and accordingly,
the information transmission from S to D with the assis-
tance of R requires two time slots to complete. In the first
time slot, S transmits signals to R and D. After decoding
the information, in the second time slot, R forwards the re-
encoded signals to D. To enhance physical layer security
by preventing the K Es from eavesdropping the confiden-
tial signal sent by S to D, we consider that R employs the
CJ-aided secure communication scheme. Specifically, R
employs transmit beamforming for delivering the confi-
dential information to D and at the same time generates
Gaussian artificial noise to confuse the K Es.
Throughout this paper, the K Es are passive and the goal
is to interpret the transmission information without try-
ing to modify it. It is assumed that S and R can (partially)
obtain the CSI associated with Es through, e.g., estimat-
ing channels based on Es’ transmitted signals, while they
do not know the location of Eve. As Es’ location changes,
the proposed beamforming design is able to adapt dynam-
ically to ensure the secure communications of Alice based
on the associated channels. Note that the location-based
secure robust beamforming design is beyond the scope of
this paper, while the interested readers can refer to [28]
and the reference therein for more information. Let the
channel coefficients over links S → D, S → Ek , S → R,
R → D, and R → Ek (k ∈ K) be denoted by hSD, hSEk ,
hSR ∈ CN×1, hRD ∈ CN×1, and hREk ∈ CN×1, respec-
tively. All channel coefficients are quasi-stationary with
flat-fading Rayleigh distribution.
Then, by denoting the confidential signal sent by S as x,




PshTSRx + nR (1)
y1D =
√
PshSDx + n1D (2)
y1Ek =
√
PshSEk x + n1Ek (3)
where Ps is the transmit power at the S. nR, n1D, and
n1Ek are the complex Gaussian noises at the R, D, and Ek
with nR ∼ CN (0, σ 2I), n1D ∼ CN (0, σ 2) and n1Ek ∼
CN (0, σ 2), respectively. For notational convenience, we
assume that the noise power at R, D, and Es are identical
and normalized to be unity (i.e., σ 2 = 1) without loss of
generality.
Using (1), the information rate at R is given by





where the factor 1/2 accounts for the fact that the overall
transmission is divided into two time slots.
In the second time slot, R successfully decodes the
source signal and then forwards the re-encoded signal
to D together with a jamming signal. Specifically, let the
sent signal of R in the second time slot be denoted by
x˜ = wx+ z, where w ∈ CN×1 denotes the transmit beam-
forming vector carrying the confidential information and
z ∈ CN×1 denotes the complex Gaussian jamming signal
generated by R, which is a CSCG random vector with zero
Fig. 1 System model of DF-based relay beamforming and CJ
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mean and covariance   0, i.e., z ∼ CN (0,). Then, the
received signals at D and Ek are respectively denoted as
y2D = hTRDwx + hTRDz + n2D (5)
y2Ek = hTREkwx + hTREkz + n2Ek (6)
where n2D and n2Ek denote the complex Gaussian noises
at D and Ek with n2D ∼ CN (0, σ 2) and n2Ek ∼ CN (0, σ 2),
respectively.
Using maximum ratio combination (MRC) to combine
(2) and (5) [29, 30], the information rate at D is given by
RD(w,) = 12 log2
(







Similarly, using (3) and (6), the information rate at Ek by










, ∀k ∈ K.
(8)
For the secure MISO relay communication in the pres-
ence of multiple eavesdroppers, the achievable secrecy
rate is given by [15]
R = min
k∈K
RD(w,) − REk (w,). (9)
Following [12], to ensure the R correctly decode the
source message, the rate at R should no less than the rate
at D, i.e.,
RR ≥ RD(w,). (10)
On the other hand, the total transmit power (signal
power plus jamming signal power) at R is limited by the
maximum allowable transmit power Pr , i.e.,
tr(wwH) + tr() ≤ Pr . (11)
2.2 Problem formulation
In this paper, we consider imperfect CSI at the transmitter
due to channel quantization and feedback errors. In other
words, the CSI from S/R to D/Es is imperfectly known at S
and R. Here, the CSI uncertainties are modeled by worst-
case model as in [21, 31]. In this case, we consider that the
estimated wireless channels over links S → D, S → Ek ,
R → D, and R → Ek (k ∈ K) are denoted by h˜SD, h˜SEk ,
h˜RD, and h˜REk , respectively. We assume that the chan-
nel uncertainty is bounded, and accordingly denote the
regions of the exact wireless channels hSD, hSEk , hRD, and
hREk asHSD,HSEk ,HRD, andHREk , respectively, which are
given by
HSD = {hSD|hSD = hSD − h˜SD, |hSD| ≤ δSD}, (12)
HSEk = {hSEk |hSEk = hSEk − h˜SEk , |hSEk | ≤ δSEk },
∀k ∈ K
(13)
HRD = {hRD|hRD = hRD−h˜RD, ‖hRD‖ ≤ δRD}, (14)
HREk = {hREk |hREk = hREk − h˜REk , ‖hREk‖ ≤ δREk },
∀k ∈ K
(15)
wherehSD,hSEk ,hRD, andhREk denote the channel
uncertainties, respectively. And δSD, δSEk , δRD, δREk denote
the error bounds corresponding uncertainty regions,
respectively.
Under the channel uncertainty model, our objective is to
maximize the achievable secrecy rate at D in (9) by jointly
optimizing the beamforming vectorw of the desirable sig-
nal and the transmit covariance  of the jamming signal
at R subject to the information rate constraint in (10) and
its total transmit power constraint at R in (11). As a result,








RD(w,) − REk (w,)
(16a)
s.t. RR ≥ RD(w,) (16b)
tr(wwH) + tr() ≤ Pr
(16c)
  0. (16d)
Problem (16) is challenging to be solved due to the
non-convex objective function (16a) (the objective func-
tion is the difference of two logarithm functions) and the
semi-infinite constraint (16b) (due to the norm-bounded
CSI errors). We address this challenge in the following
section.
3 Optimal solution
In this section, we employ the SDR technique to solve
problem (16). Define W = wwH with W  0 and
rank(W) ≤ 1. Then, by substituting wwH asW and intro-
ducing a slack variable α ≥ 0, problem (16) is equivalently
expressed as







































≤ 12 log2(1 + Ps‖hSR‖
2), (17c)
tr(W) + tr() ≤ Pr , (17d)
W  0,  0,α ≥ 0, (17e)
rank(W) ≤ 1. (17f)
Furthermore, introducing a slack variable γ ≥ 0, prob-

































(17d) − (17f ), (18e)
where function log2(·) is omitted since the logarithm is a
monotonically increasing function that has no effect on
the optimization problem.
To simplify problem (18e), we introduce three variables
a, b, c, and d to replace the worst-case direct link signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) at D and Ek for constraints (18b)–(18d).
First, we minimize the direct link SNR at D for constraint
(18b), which is [26]
a = min
hSD∈HSD
Ps|hSD|2 = Ps||h˜SD| − δSD|2. (19)
Likewise, we maximize the direct link SNR at Ek for
constraint (18c), which is
b = max
hSEk∈HSEk
Ps|hSEk |2 = Ps||h˜SEk | + δSEk |2, ∀k ∈ K.
(20)
In addition, we maximize the direct link SNR at D for
constraint (18d), which is
c = max
hSD∈HSD
Ps|hSD|2 = Ps||h˜SD| + δSD|2. (21)








Similarly, for constraints (18c) and (18d), since we have
(20) and (21), then they can be respectively simplified as
max
hREk∈HREk
(1 + b) + hTREk [W + (1 + b)]h∗REk
1 + hTREkh∗REk









where d = Ps‖hSR‖2.





tr(W) + tr() ≤ Pr ,
W  0,  0,α ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0,
rank(W) ≤ 1. (25)




, Wˆ = tW, and ˆ = t (26)
where t ≥ 0 is a complimentary slackness parameter.
Using Charnes-Cooper transformation [32], problem (25)
is equivalently transformed as










(1 + b)t + hTREk [Wˆ + (1 + b)ˆ]h∗REk
t + hTREk ˆh∗REk
≤ α, ∀k ∈ K (27c)
max
hRD∈HRD
αhTRDWˆh∗RD ≤ d − c, (27d)
α(t + hTRDˆh∗RD) ≤ 1, ∀hRD ∈ HRD, (27e)
tr(Wˆ) + tr(ˆ) ≤ tPr , (27f)
Wˆ  0, ˆ  0, γ ≥ 0,α ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, (27g)
rank(Wˆ) ≤ 1. (27h)
Problem (27) has semi-infinite constraints (27b)–(27e)
and non-convex rank-one constraint (27h), which are
intractable. Denoting the optimal solution to problem (27)
as (Wˆo, ˆo, to) and the corresponding optimal objective
value as γ o, using SDR to obtain (Wˆo, ˆo, to) under given
α, and using 1-D line search to search the optimal α, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution (Wˆo, ˆo, to) to
problem (27) should satisfy the following equation:
max
hRD∈HRD
hTRDˆohRD + to = 1/α. (28)
Proof. Please refer to the “Appendix 1” section.
To make problem (27) tractable, we first employ the
S-procedure [34] to convert the constraints (27b)–(27e)
into linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) [35]. For constraint
(27b), we substitute (13) into (27b) and rewrite it as follows
{
−hTRD1hRD − 2Re{(h˜RD1)Th∗RD} − h˜TRD1h˜∗RD + γ − (1 + a)t ≤ 0
∀hRD : ‖hRD‖ ≤ δRD
(29)
where 1 = Wˆ + (1 + a)ˆ.
By applying S-procedure and introducing a slack vari-
able λ1 ≥ 0, we convert (29) into an LMI given by
T1 =
[
λ1I/δ2RD + 1 1h˜∗RD













REk + (α − 1 − b)t − uk
]




λ2I/δ2RD − 3 −3h˜∗RD






λ3I/δ2RD − ˆ −ˆh˜∗RD




where 2 = (α − 1 − b)ˆ − Wˆ, and 3 = αWˆ. λ1 ≥ 0,
λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, and uk ≥ 0 are introduced slack variables.






tr(Wˆ) + tr(ˆ) ≤ tPr ,
Wˆ  0, ˆ  0,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0,uk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
γ ≥ 0,α ≥ 0, t ≥ 0,
rank(Wˆ) ≤ 1. (34)
Problem (34) is still non-convex due to the rank-one
constraint of Wˆ. To meet this challenge, we use the
SDR technique here. By dropping the rank-one constraint,
problem (34) becomes a convex semidefinite program
(SDP) for a given α that consists of a linear objective func-
tion together with a set of LMI constraints, which can
thus be solved effectively via standard convex optimiza-
tion techniques such as the interior point method [35].
As a result, we can recast problem (34) as a two-layer
optimization problem.
The outer layer is a one-variable optimization problem
in terms of α, and the inner layer is a convex SDP problem
with fixed α. Thus, we need to search for α. The upper
bound of α is derived as




≤ 1 + Pr‖hRD‖2
= 1 + Pr(‖h˜RD‖ + δRD)2.
(35)
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s.t. 1 ≤ α ≤ 1 + Pr(‖h˜RD‖ + δRD)2 (36)
where
f (α) = max
Wˆ,ˆ,γ ,α,t,λ1,λ2,λ3,uk (37)
s.t. all constraints in problem (34).
Here, if Wˆo is of rank-one, then the solution of the SDR
is the optimal solution to the original problem (34) (in
other words, the SDR of problem (34) is tight). In this
case, the optimal robust beamforming vector at R can
be exactly obtained as wo via employing the eigenvalue
decompositionWo = wo(wo)H ; otherwise, it is not in gen-
eral. Fortunately, due to the specific structure of problem
(34), we can prove in the following that Wˆo is indeed of
rank one. Accordingly, the obtained optimal solution to
the SDR of (34) is indeed the optimal solution to the origi-
nal problem (34). The robust beamforming design without
direct transmission (DT) from S to D and from S to Es is a
special case of (34) with a = 0, b = 0.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution to the SDR of prob-
lem (34), Wˆo, is always of rank one.
Proof. Please refer to the “Appendix 2” section.
Remark 1. It is obvious that the main computation
complexity stems from the computation of Wˆo in the









ing to [36]. Here, msdp denotes the number of semidefi-
nite cone constraints, nsdp denotes the dimension of the
semidefinite cone, and 
 is the accuracy of solving the SDP.
Comparing the SDP of (34) with the standard form in [36],
we have msdp = K + 4 and nsdp = N + 1. As a result, the
computational complexity of the proposed scheme is
O {L [(K + 4)(N + 1)3.5 + (K + 4)2(N + 1)2.5
+(K + 4)3(N + 1)0.5]} log(1/
) (38)
where L is the number of 1-D search.
4 Numerical results
In this section, we present simulation results to show the
performance of the proposed robust joint beamforming
and CJ design in DF relay system under channel uncer-
tainty. We assume relay has four antennas, i.e.,N = 4, and
the number of eavesdroppers is K = 3. All the channel
coefficients are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) CSCG random variables with zeromean
and unit variance. The transmit power at S is Ps = 0 dB.
For simplicity, we assume the error bounds are the same,
i.e., δSD = δSEk = δRD = δREk = δ. We average the worst-
case secrecy rate via conducting 1000 randomly generated
channel realizations.
Figure 2 presents the average secrecy rate comparison
of our proposed robust beamforming with CJ scheme
Fig. 2 Average secrecy rate versus the maximum total transmit power constraint Pr at R under the error bound δ = 0.2
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Fig. 3 Average secrecy rate versus the maximum total transmit power constraint Pr at R for different error bound δ
(denoted as “robust with CJ”), robust beamforming with-
out CJ scheme (denoted as “robust without CJ”), and
robust beamforming without DT scheme (denoted as
“robust without DT”) under the error bound δ = 0.2.
Here, the robust without CJ scheme is obtained by solv-
ing problem (34) with  = 0 [26]. From Fig. 2, it is
observed that the average secrecy rate increases as the
maximum total transmit power of relay increases and
our proposed robust beamforming with CJ scheme is
superior to all its counterparts in improving the secrecy
rate.
Figure 3 shows the average secrecy rate versus the
maximum total transmit power constraint at R for the
comparison of both imperfect CSI and perfect CSI cases.
It is observed that the average secrecy rate for perfect
CSI is higher than that in imperfect CSI cases. As the
Fig. 4 Comparison between different number of eavesdroppers for fixed δ = 0.2, i.e., K = 3, K = 6 and K = 9, respectively
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Fig. 5 Comparison between different transmit antennas at relay for fixed δ = 0.2, i.e., N = 4, N = 6 and N = 8, respectively
uncertainty bounds increase, the system becomes more
roust against uncertainty; however, the achievable secrecy
rate degrades. From Fig. 3, it is also observed that the
secrecy rate increases with increase of maximum total
transmit power at R and exhibits saturation behavior in
high relay transmit power due to the constraint (10).
Figure 4 plots the average secrecy rate for K = 3, 6, 9
eavesdroppers under N = 4, respectively. It can be
observed that as eavesdropper number K increases, the
average secrecy rate would decrease. More eavesdrop-
pers would surely degrade system performance. Figure 5
depicts the comparison of the average secrecy rate for dif-
ferent transmit antennas at relay. It is shown in Fig. 5 that
the average secrecy rate is lifted to a higher level when
more transmit antennas are equipped on relay. This is due
to the fact that when the number of antennas increases,
it means that there are more channels in the relay sys-
tem and thenmore spatial degrees of freedom are utilized.
Since the secrecy rate of each channel is non-negative,
the increasing number of channels means an increase of
system secrecy rate.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated robust beamforming and
CJ design for a DF-based relay system in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. We jointly optimized the trans-
mit beamforming vector and the covariance matrix of
jamming signals at the relay to maximize the achiev-
able secrecy rate at the destination while ensuring the
total transmit power constraint at the relay, in which we
took into account imperfect CSI subject to norm-bounded
errors. By applying the techniques of SDR together with
a 1-D search, we have obtained the optimal solution. Fur-
thermore, we proved that the SDR of the problem is tight.
Simulation results have shown that the validity of the
proposed scheme.
Appendix 1
Proof of proposition 1
If (Wˆo, ˆo, to) is optimal solution of problem (27), we have
min
hRD∈HRD
(1 + a)t + hTRD[Wˆo + (1 + a)ˆo]h∗RD = γ o
(39)
Following the idea of [33] to prove this proposition, by
reduction ad absurdum, we consider the following two
situations. If maxhRD∈HRD hTRDˆoh∗RD + to ≤ 1/α and
tr(Wˆo) + tr(ˆo) < toPr , we can always find t = to +
t,t > 0, which satisfies constraints (27c)-(27f). Thus,
we can find the large objective value γ o + t which
satisfies (39). If maxhRD∈HRD hTRDˆoh∗RD + to ≤ 1/α
and tr(Wˆo) + tr(ˆo) = toPr , we can find a solution
(Wˆo, ˆo + ˆ, to + t),ˆ  0,t > 0, which makes
the constraint maxhRD∈HRD hTRDˆoh∗RD+to ≤ 1/α tighter
while satisfying constraints (27c), (27d). As a result, these
contradict that (Wˆo, ˆo, to) is the optimal solution to
problem (27).
Appendix 2
Proof of proposition 2
We prove the rank condition of Wˆ through Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The partial Lagrangian
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of primal problem (34) with respect to Wˆ is
given by
L = γ − tr(B1T1) − tr(B2kT2k) − tr(B3T3)
+ μ[ tr(Wˆ) + tr(ˆ) − tPr]−tr(B4Wˆ) (40)
where the dual variables B1 ∈ H+, B2k ∈ H+, B3 ∈ H+,
B4 ∈ H+ (H+ denotes Hermitian matrix), and μ ≥ 0 are
corresponding to the constraintsT1  0,T2k  0,T3  0,
Wˆ  0, and tr(Wˆ) + tr(ˆ) − tPr ≤ 0 in (34), respectively.
Taking the partial derivative of (40) with respect to Wˆ
and applying KKT conditions, we have




− B4 = 0 (41)
where HRD = [ IN , h˜RD], HREk = [ IN , h˜REk ]. It is noted
that B4Wˆ = 0 from KKT conditions. Since the size of B1
andT1 is (N+1)×(N+1), we have rank(B1)+rank(T1) ≤
N+1. Since the dimension ofB1 andT1 is (N+1)×(N+1),
according to the Sylvester’s rank inequality [37], we have
rank(B1) + rank(T1) − (N + 1) ≤ rank(B1T1), then
rank(B1) + rank(T1) ≤ N + 1.
From S-procedure [34], we get the slack variable λ1 ≥ 0.
Next, we show that λ1 > 0 via reduction ad absurdum.We
consider the following situation. If λ1 = 0, the constraint
‖hRD‖ ≤ δRD is not active because λ1 is its dual vari-
able associated with the constraint in (30). If ‖hRD‖ ≤
δRD, ‖hRD‖ is the worst channel uncertainty to mini-
mize (1 + a)t + hTRD[Wˆ + (1 + a)ˆ]h∗RD in constraint
(27b), we can always find a scaler ρ > 1 which satisfies
‖ρhRD‖ ≤ δRD. By substituting ρhRD into (1 + a)t +
hTRD[Wˆ + (1 + a)ˆ]h∗RD, we get the lower value than that
obtained by hRD. It is contradictory to the assumption
thathRD minimizes (1+a)t+hTRD[Wˆ+(1+a)ˆ]h∗RD. As
a result, rank(T1) ≥ N and rank(B1) ≤ 1 hold when λ1 >
0. Furthermore, rank(B1) = 0, so we have rank(B1) = 1.
Similarly, we have rank(B2k) = rank(B3) = rank(B4) = 1.
Multiplying both sides of (41) with Wˆ
(
μI + HREkB2HHREk + HRDB3HHRD
)
Wˆ = (B4 + HRDB1HHRD) Wˆ
= HRDB1HHRDWˆ
(42)






Due to the fact that rank(B1) = 1 from the above
proof, we obtain rank
(HRDB1HHRD) = 1; thus, we have
rank(Wˆ) ≤ 1. As RD(Wˆ, ˆ) > 0, rank(Wˆ) must not be 0,
we have rank(Wˆ) = 1. This completes the proof.
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